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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STANLEY TITLE COMPANY, 
a corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND 
TRUST COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12271 
STATEMENTOFTHENATUREOF 
THE CASE 
Complaint in equity to set aside judgment void on 
its face for want of due process of law under the Con-
stitution of the United States and the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
By pleading entitled "Motion to Dismiss" the 
lower court entered an "ORDER" granting judgment 
on the pleadings and summary judgment, and dismissed 
the action with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order directing the lower court 
to vacate its order granting judgment on the pleadings 
and summary judgment, and dismissing the complaint 
with prejudice, and that the motion to dismiss be denied 
and the respondent required to answer or otherwise 
plead to said complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case is the outgrowth of a case which has been 
before this Supreme Court, entitled W. P. HARLIN 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY vs. CONTINEN-
TAL BANK & TRUST COMPAY, et al., being case 
No. 169179 in the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, and case No. 11504 in this Su-
preme Court, and the files and records in said Case No. 
11504 have been made a part of the cause of action in 
the present action and are before this Supreme Court 
on this appeal in their entirety. (Rec. 25-27). The case 
is reported in 23 Utah 2d 422, 464 P.2d 585 ( 1970). 
The complaint in said case No. 169179 was filed Decem-
ber 21, 1966. Judgment was entered in said case No. 
169179 on January 16, 1969, on the main case, but no 
2 
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judgment was entered on the cross claim of Continental 
.Bank. (Rec. 189 in case No. 11504). 
On January 22, 1970, the Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment entered by Harlan Construction 
Company on its complaint, and also on the judgment 
on the cross-claim which had never been entered and 
and was not before the court. ( 23 Utah 2d 422) ( 464 
P.2d 589). 
On February 26, 1970, Continental on ex parte 
application and without notice to Stanley Title Com-
pany obtained a judgment of the District Court for $11,-
082.60 against the cross defendant Stanley Title Com-
pany (Rec. 11-12) 
On July 2nd, 1970, the present action subject of 
thfo appeal was filed, the complaint being in equity 
and to it were attached Exhibits A, B, C, and D, seek-
ing to set aside the judgment entered on February 26, 
1970, as against Stanley Title Company. (Rec. 1-14). 
On July 13th, 1970, Continental filed a "MOTION 
TO DISMISS" (Rec. 15). 
On August 14th, 1970, the motion to dismiss was 
heard, and the minute entry reads as follows: 
THE DEFENDANTS MOTION TO DIS-
lVIISS COMES NOW ON AND BEFORE 
THE COURT FOR HEARING, GEORGE 
STANLEY APPEARING ON BEHALF 
OF THE PLAINTIFF AS COUNSEL. 
ALBERT COLTON APPEARING ON 
BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANT AS 
3 
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COUNSEL. WHEREUPON THE DE-
FENDANTS MOTION TO DISMISS IS 
ARGUED TO THE COURT BY RESPEC-
TIVE COUNSEL AND THE MATTER 
IS SUBMITTED. THEREUPON THE 
COURT GRANTS THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS. (Rec. 31) 
On September 1, 1970, an "ORDER" was entered 
(Rec. 20-22) which reads as follows: 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss coming on for 
hearing before The Honorable James Sawaya 
on Friday, August 14, 1970; plaintiff being rep-
resented by George Stanley, Esq. and defendant 
by Albert J. Colton of Fabian & Clendenin, and 
argument being heard, and the Court having 
considered the pleadings, the entire file in W. P. 
Harlin Construction Company vs. The Continen-
tal Bank & Trust Company, et al., Civil No. 
269179, in the District Court of Salt Lake Coun-
ty, and the stipulated fact that the records of 
the Secretary of State show that effective Sep-
tember 30, 1967, plaintiff was suspended by the 
State Tax Commission of the State of Utah pur-
suant to the provisions of Section 59-13-61, 
U.C.A. 1953, and that the last annual report 
required by Section 16-10-121, U.C.A. 1953 
was filed by plaintiff with the Secretary of State 
on March 6, 1868, and the Court, therefore, pur-
suant to Rule 12 ( c), Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, having treated defendant's motion as one 
for summary judgment, and no facts being in 
dispute, and good cause appearing therefor; 
It is hereby ORDERED: 
That plaintiff's complaint be and hereby is dis-
mised with prejudice. 
4 
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ATTEST: 
\V. STERLING EV ANS 
CLERK 
By Byron Stark 
Deputy Clerk 
BY THE COURT: 
James S. Sawaya 
Judge. 
Other than the above listed documents, there are 
no exhibits, motions, affidavits, or other matters in the 
files to sustain the motion of the defendant which was 
granted. 
Notice of appeal was filed September 29, 1970 
(Rec. 24) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE PROVISION OF THE "ORDER" AP-
PEALED FROM RELATING TO RULE 12(c) 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, IS 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND 
VOID FOR THE REASON THAT THE PRO-
VISIONS OF SAID RULE 12 ( c) HAVE NOT 
BEEN COMPLIED WITH. 
RULE 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure reads as follows: 
( c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 
After the pleadings are closed but within such 
5 
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time as not to delay the trial, any party may move 
for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside 
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded 
by the court, the motion shall be treated as ont 
for summary judgment and disposed of as pro-
vided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given 
reasonable opportunity to present all material 
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
No motion for judgment on the pleadings has been 
filed. 
No answer is in the files or records, and hence the 
pleadings were not closed. 
No exhibits, stipulations or affidavits appear in the 
record. 
The minute record of the court (Rec. 31) mentions 
no motion for judgment on the pleadings. 
In view of the record there was no motion made 
under Rule 12 ( c) , and none was considered. In this 
respect the order is void for want of jurisdiction 
POINT II. 
THE PROVISION OF THE "ORDER" (Rec. 20-
22) APPEALED FROM RELATING TO SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT, IS WITHOUT DUE PRO-
CESS OF LAW AND VOID FOR THE REA-
SON THAT THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 56, 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 
HA VE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH. 
6 
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--
Rule 56 ( c), supra, reads as follows: 
(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS 
THEREON. The motion shall be served at 
least 10 days before the time fixed for the hear-
ing. The adverse party prior to the day of hear-
ing may serve opposing affidavits. The judg-
ment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, to-
gether with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. 
The case of Christensen v. Financial Service Co .. 
14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P2d 1010, a case on summary 
judgment, has this to say: 
Summary judgment can properly be granted 
under Rule 56 only if "the pleadings, deposi-
tions, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any," which are offered, show with-
out dispute that the party is entitled to prevail. 
This condition is obviously not met if the allega-
tions of the plaintiff's complaint stand in oppo-
sition to the averments of the affidavits so that 
there are controverted issues of fact, the deter-
mination of which is necessary to settle the rights 
of the parties. The trial judge correctly ruled 
that there were such issues of fact here. The 
cases relied upon by the defendant are distin-
guishable, since an admittedly different situation 
exists where the averments in the affidavits or 
facts shown by depositions and/ or exhibits would 
undisputably resolve the material facts. Conti-
nental Bank & Trust Co. v. Cunningham, 10 
Utah 2d 329, 353 P2d 168 . 
7 
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No motion for summary judgment is in the files. 
No answer, exhibits, stipulations nor affidavits 
appear in the record, nor any other pleading or writing 
to set forth any facts or other matters upon which de-
fendant relies for summary judgment. 
In view of the record there was no motion under 
Rule 56 for summary judgment and none was con-
sidered. In this respect the "ORDER" was without due 
process of law, and is void for want of jurisdiction. 
POINT III. 
THE STATEMENTS OF THE "ORDER" (Rec. 
20-22) CONCERNING THE PROVISIONS OF 
SECTION 59-13-61 U.C.A. 1953, AND SECTION 
16-10-121, U.C.A. 1953, DO NOT BAR PLAIN-
TIFF FROM BRINGING THIS ACTION AND 
MAINTAINING IT. 
The record shows no stipulated facts, or that any 
stipulations were made as to facts. The "Motion to Dis-
miss" reads in part as follows: 
2. Plaintiff corporation was a Utah corporation. 
Its franchise was suspended in 1967 for failure 
to pay taxes, and it has failed to file an annual 
report since 1968. 
Pursuant to # 59-13-61 UCA 1953 upon non-
payment of taxes by a Utah corporation, all of 
its corporate powers, rights and privileges are 
suspended and such plaintiff is barred from 
bringing this action. 
8 
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This Point 2 cannot be considered on the "1\ilotion 
to Dismiss" as it is a matter of defense that cannot be 
heard by motion. Rule 12 (b) of the Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, states in part as follows: 
(b) HOW PRESENTED. Every defense, in 
law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, 
whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third party claim, shall be asserted in the respon-
sive pleading thereto if one is required, except 
that the following defense may at the option of 
the pleader be made by motion: * * * ( 6) fail-
ure to state a claim upon which {elief can be 
granted * * *. 
The other provisions of the rule which may be taken 
by motion go to jurisdiction, venue, process and failure 
to join an indispensable party. There is no provision 
that the matters in said paragraph 2 above can be made 
part of a motion to dismiss. 
There are no writings, exhibits, certificates of state 
officers, or any other matters in the record to support 
said paragraph 2 above set forth. Even if the facts 
alleged in said paragraph 2 were true, which is not 
admitted by appellant, it would be of no consequence 
as Section 16-10-101, in Replacement Volume 2, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, provides as follows: 
CONTINUATION OF CORPORATE EX-
ISTENCE TO WIND UP AFTER DIS-
SOLUTION-Notwithstanding the dissolution 
of a corporation either ( 1) by the issuance of a 
certificate of dissolution by the secretary of state, 
or ( 2) by a decree of court, or ( 3) by expiration 
9 
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of its period of duration, the corporate existence 
of such corporation shall nevertheless continue 
for the purpose of winding up its affairs in re-
spect to any property and assets which have not 
been distributed or otherwise disposed of prior 
to such dissolution, and to effect such purpose 
may sell or otherwise dispose of such property 
and assets, sue and be sued, contract, and exercise 
all other incidental and necessary powers. 
It appears that Continental in the present suit is 
relying upon the f0rfeiture of the charter of Stanley 
Title Company as ~s basis for dismissal of the action. 
Section 59-13-61, { C.A. 1953, reads as follows: 
FAILURE. TO PAY TAX-SUSPENSION 
OR FORFEITURE OF CORPORATE 
RIGHTS.-If a tax computed and levied here-
under is not aid before 5 o'clock p.m. on the 
last day of t1 ~ eleventh month after the date 
of delinquenc1 the corporate powers, rights and 
privileges of the delinquent taxpayer, if it is 
a domestic ,.. Jrporation, shall be suspended, and 
if a foreign co""poration, it_ shall thereupon forfeit 
its rights to db intrastate business in the state. 
The tax comntission shall transmit the name of 
each such corporation to the secretary of state, 
who shall immediately record the same in such 
manner that ·it may be available to the public. 
The suspension or forfeiture herein provided for 
shall become effective from the time such record 
is made, and the certificate of the secretary of 
state shall be prima facie evidence of such sus-
pension or forfeiture. 
The record shows that the cross claim made in civil 
action No. 169179 by Continental against Stanley Title 
10 
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Company was filed January 13, 1967. The "Order" 
(Rec. 20-22) which is the subject to this appeal alleges 
that the charter of Stanley Title Company was not 
suspended until September 30, 1967. From the face 
of the record the present action was commenced before 
the charter was suspended. 
The closest case in point is that of Prudential Fed. 
S. & L. Ass'n. v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 7 Utah 
2d 366, 325 P.2d 899, at pages 904 and 905, states of 
foreign corporations: . t~i 
. 1 
It is noteworthy that Sec. 59.-~3-61 does not spell 
out any disability of corporations so disenfran-
chisen as to sue as does Sec. i6~-3, quoted above, 
relating to failure to qualify. 
( 9) We have found no ct~'>e dealing precisely 
with the question posed. Btli .. this court has held 
that the bringing of one sui,; by a foreign corpo-
ration to protect its rights. 'does not constitute 
"doing business" within the-~}ate, and that be-
fore the acts of a foreign .. tcorporation "could 
properly be classified as doing business within 
the State, it would have to .be shown that there 
was some degree of continuity or regularity of 
such acts, coupled with some other manner of 
entering into direct business transactions with 
others." The logical conclusion from such hold-
ings is that 59-13-61 would not prevent Felt 
from bringing suit to enforce the rights growing 
out of business transacted while it was franchised 
here, even though its franchise had been revoked, 
because the bringing of one suit under such cir-
cumstances would not be doing "intrastate busi-
ness" within the meaning of that section. 
11 
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If a foreign corporation is allowed to sue and be 
sued even though its rights have been forfeited to do 
intrastate business in this state, it cannot be said that 
a domestic corporation whose rights to do business have 
not been so forfeited, cannot sue and be sued under 
Section 59-13-61 in the light of the last above case. 
Furthermore, Section 59-13-63 provides "Relief in 
case of suspension or forfeiture." There is no allegation 
that such relief has not been obtained by the plaintiff. 
Even though proper pleading, it would be faulty in that 
respect. 
It is contended by appellant that from the facts 
alleged in the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. 15-16) pertain-
ing to the right of Stanley Title Company to do busi-
ness are not proper matters to be considered on such 
motion, that such facts are matters of defense by answer, 
there are no evidentiary matters in the record to support 
such facts, and appellant has a right to a defense to 
any such facts before a ruling can be made thereon. 
POINT IV. 
THE COMPLAINT AND ITS EXHIBITS (Rec. 
1-14) ALLEGE A CAUSE OF ACTION AND 
FACTS WHICH STATE A CLAIM AGAINST 
DEFENDANT UPON 'VHICH RELIEF l\iA Y 
BE GRANTED. 
RULE 60 (b) of the UTAH RULES OF CIYIL 
PROCEDURE provides: 
12 
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(b) MISTAKES; INADVERTENCE; EX-
CUSABLE NEGLECT; NEWLY DIS-
COVERED EVIDENCE; FRAUD, ETC. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the follow-
ing reasons: * * * * ( 5) the judgment is void; 
* * * * The motion shall be made within a rea-
sonable time and for reasons ( 1), ( 2) , ( 3) , or 
( 4), not more than 3 months after the judg-
ment, order, or proceedings was entered or taken. 
* * This rule does not limit the power of a court 
to entertain an independent action to relieve a 
party from a judgment, order or proceeding 
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief 
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed 
in these rules or by an independent action. 
It is to be noted that the complaint (Rec. 1-14) 
is based upon facts which are shown on the face of the 
record itself. These facts as alleged show the following: 
1. The Cross Claim (Rec. 7 -8) is contingent on the 
outcome of the original action and does not state an 
existing cause of action. 
2. The Cross Claim was dismissed and abandoned 
by Continental (Exhibit D, Rec. 14). 
3. No trial was held on the Cross Claim (Rec. 2). 
4. The lower court did not mention the cross claim 
during the entire proceeding (Rec. 2). 
5. No findings of fact, conclusions of law nor judg-
13 
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ments were filed in Civil Action No. 169179, which were 
made or filed by the cross-claimant, Continental. 
6. The judgment of February 26th, 1970 (Rec. 
11-13) was based upon a conclusion of law in the con-
clusions of Harlin Construction Company, plaintiff in 
the main action, and Harlin Construction Company was 
not a party to the cross claim. 
7. The judgment in favor of Harlin Construction 
Company has been fully paid. 
From the above allegations, appellant submits that 
the complaint does state facts which constitute a claim 
against defendant. No other question is involved in the 
motion to dismiss. 
In the case of Liquor Control Commission v. Athas, 
243 P.2d 441, this Supreme Court said: 
Where the complaint states a claim in general 
language but is not sufficiently definite in certain 
respects to enable defendant to answer, the rem-
edy is a motion for a more definite statement, 
not a motion to dismiss. Porter v. Karavas, 10 
Cir. 157 F.2d 984. 
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, a claim 
upon which relief may be granted can be pleaded 
by the recitation of conclusi?ns of la~ or f~ct 
or both. l\fails v. Kansas City Pubhc Service 
Co., D.C., 51 F. Supp. 562; 1 Barron and Holtz-
off, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules Ed. 
22 Am. Bar Assn. Jul. 447. 
In the case of Bowen v. Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 
P.2d 602, the court was considering the vacating of a 
14 
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judgment entered more than three years prior to the 
commencement of the action. This court said: 
This court made it clear that the remedy by the 
statute is not exclusive and that a suit in equity 
lo set aside a judgment for fraud in its procure-
ment may be brought after the time limited in 
the statute for a motion to set aside a judgment. 
Rule 60 (b), URCP, supersedes and is substan-
tially the same as Sec. 104-14-4, U.C.A. 1943. 
The Rule s_pecifically provides that it "does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an inde-
pendent action to relieve a party from a judg-
ment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judg-
ment for fraud upon the court." 
* * * * 
As stated in Butler v. McKey, 9 Cir., 138 F.2d 
373, 376, "It is a basic rule that a judgment is 
void and subject to collateral attack if a lack of 
jurisdiction in the court appears on the face of 
the record." 
POINT V. 
THE CROSS CLAIM OF CONTINENTAL 
BANK IN THE ORIGINAL ACTION 169179 
WAS DISMISSED AND ABANDONED. 
The original Cross Claim reads as follows: (Rec. 
7-8): 
As a cross claim against defendant Stanley Title 
Company, defendant, The Continental Bank and 
Trust Company alleges: 
I. On or about September 6, 1966, the proceeds 
of the check, a copy of which is identified as 
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Exhibit A to the complaint, were paid by this 
defendant to defendant Stanley Title Company. 
2. ~lainti~ claims said proceeds were wrongfully 
paid by this defendant to the defendant Stanley 
Title Company. 
3. If plaintiff recovers judgment against The 
Continental Bank and Trust Company by reason 
of such payment, Stanley Title Company has 
been unjustly enriched thereby and The Con-
tinental Bank and Trust Company is entitled to 
recover the amount of any judgment by plain-
tiff against it from defendant Stanley Title Com-
pany. 
'VHEREFORE, The Continental Bank and 
Trust Company prays: 
I. That plaintiff take nothing by its complaint. 
2. That if plaintiff recm-er judgment against it, 
The Continental X ational Bank and Trust Com-
pany have judgment against Stanley Title Com-
pany in such amount as the court may award 
plaintiff against The Continental Bank and Trust 
Company. 
3. For its costs in this action and such other re-
lief as the court may deem appropriate in the cir-
cumstances. 
Dated this l:.?th day of J~1nuai:-. 1967. 
Peter 'y. Billing-s 
Fabian & Clendenin 
~00 Conti1wnt~l Bank Building 
Snlt L:lkt> CitY. Ctah 
Ath)rnt'Y~ t\)r ·Dt.,frndant 
'l'lw (\\;lti1wnt:ll Bank and Trust Company 
In t'x:tminin~· tht' ··_-\XS\YER AXD CROSS 
CL.\ l :\l OF THE CllX Tl X FXT.:\L B~-\XK AND 
l~ 
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TR l-S T CO)IP A....'Y" (Rec. 5-8 J the tntirt d1><:1J-
lllt::i: :..s (•nly one document and is a C11uurungJing 'Jf 
:I:.C- ~-\~ ... \\-er with the Cross Claim. They C11r.utitute 'Jfv; 
;_c-:..--~:: The prayer is one prayer. The plaintiff i, 
:::._: ~.=.c- ~ p:irty to the Cross Claim. 
~-· 
I::. -il _-\Ill. J ur., pages 473-47 4, tlw: foU1Jwir.g t~ 
=:;5;_ REQrISITES; SL"l-".FICIEXCY ... 
..::\. .?·=~ c-umplaint or C.Toss petitif1n i~ in HJ1: r.a-
::~ .. ;: =: a.=i. or~ U-Jrnp.laint <1r petitil1n and rtu~t 
:·: ::..:.~ ~c-g-atior.i.s that ln..1uld tJl: ~'*ntial VJ :t11 
_:: ::---- ~ - .:.~:.~n,?~t r..1r prliti<m pury1rtirig VJ Y:::t 
..:..: ~ .:2-~-.C oi ~1:.Y ... n stat.t:d in th1; ert.~\ u1w-
-:~: -....~ cr•J~s _?elit¥JJJ.. aud ~ it an:::n aJJ 
~1..-:-:: -=s::.-=-::..~ ~ .::. statt'Uler1t 1Jf a cauY: ,ff a1~,111rJ, 
:: ~ ~..:..::~ :s ... O"-'.'Gl.irltt. \\~n ib ~utficil:r.cy i\ 
-·-.~ u~~~:... = ~-: appt:ar, eitk-r txpr~,Jy ,,, 
:-. --- _;.~ .. i.:.:1::::i:o::.. -:. .l;: :ii; faL.1..~ rJit'~\ary VJ 1:::r1t1t j·· 
--- · - ·,.;.-· :::..;.,. -, ...:..-.~,,k • ~ .. ~~ ... - .-1 It .. L,,- .. JJtJ aJ.~, ~ ___ r,.J __ -- .l.\......r:::.1 .:;. ... -, ... ~u:::t.L ••. ,. .... 
=-·-; .;..-~ .. ~~-·1' +, .1...,_ • .1.1..~t d,~ tJ ...... , ..... ,"J _ -L __ -L--- __ ;r--..J, ... .-. U,J w.....,.., L.IJa. Ur, .,,,.,.,,~ 
.-· -;..:::. •• 1:. --..·.-..<--. •: i>':::!:t 1Jf a'~'-'" a.d . .it111 _,~ -- - - .=--- - r-- - ~ .J ,,, ,. " 
• • • • 
=:,~ ~ATT_lU:'.. <Jl' PIUJCEEUJSG. ''" 
~ =--=..;; -.: :.:£ •::---.JH ':omy.lalnt d,;, u.11"~ Jlf'r 
~-I:.rZI na• ~ ~ ~i 'JfJ tt;; 'dJS~foaJ ,1,,11J1l;,.111'. 
_-_ _ ·:·-.·-~ £;'_-.-_:_..._ .:: f:. ':..:.i:_·:.t~ arJl'J irl/Jl~#Jr,r,t <::.11~ 
- u'.'":.JX_ :.·_ ~~~ ..,,.·:.e::~ ;;r'1~Jy ir1t;,'l"""'JJ ru11J 
::-...L-_-:::... -..::r- ~~ .. ~:.~ ~n711111':1,, ,,, ,_,.v,.1-1 ,,, tJ.-: 
.::..1 -:--~~- :·.eb~ .,. . ..,. ':...:::~, :,..:, w:t.111, ar11J ••~11: ,.,,,. 
-...- _ 21---~-• .c...·..e-..1..:t • i.•:"J,r,A ;;:tJl'iit1l( J;;iW'*ll tJ~ 
:..~:t': ::;L--~: .,.··~s.::: .. ~_f, 4 :C.t t.),;, 'VA.If~ fllfµ~ 
. - . . - .. . • .. .. . lit • '.J' ,. ... ~..I".,., .Al·~,,. '11~ 1w~..- t ,,,,, 
' -- L ,,..· .. £.. -·-- "-~,,, ..,_ r;,.~ ,,..,~,.,,,..."' / y 
-<.«"::: _ :r.r: S. ':.:"-.. " .. ·~ •;' r,:.:;h:.e.;t,., :Ulfj *-'In W"f 11 fl' 
_.,. .~ -~ •• .,.. ,...q .... J,. ff;1'11 tJ,-. 'W"·~ ~- _.;-(.. '£ .... ,.. "" .. ,.,, ,,, ... y ,.,.,./ 
· . ....-:. . :1 ,. -:-:y ·r·~:'*- •/,r:11;A:u11f :nA 11.1nw-.;, 
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It is to be noted that in the Answer and Cross 
Claim, there is no allegation that Continental Bank 
has sustained any damage or suffered any loss. No loss 
is pleaded. 
In the case of Greene et al. v. Knox et al., Adams 
v. Continental Nat. Bank, 71 Utah 217, 263 P. 928, 
one Adams cross-claimed against Continental Bank for 
any loss which might in the future be sustained by Adams 
on an indemnity agremeent for loss upon bonds signed 
by Adams to benefit the bank. This Supreme Court 
said: 
Independent of the foregoing, the demurrer to 
the cross-complaint was properly sustained for 
lack of an averment that appellant had sustained 
any loss or injury by reason of the execution of 
the bond. Appellant's answer to the plaintiff's 
complaint, which was made a part of his cross-
complaint against the bank, denied any breach 
of the bond or liability to the plaintiff. It is cer-
tainly essential as a ground of recovery upon 
such a contract of indemnity to show a loss by 
the complaining party. In appellant's own brief 
when discussing the statute of limitations (a 
point not here urged by respondent) , his counsel 
say: 
"Until the amount of Adams' liability on the 
bond is established, of course he cannot sue the 
bank. If he were never sued upon this bond, no 
cause of action could accrue to him as against 
the bank. When Adams is sued, he can demand 
that the security be applied according to the 
contract with the bank. But, until he has suffered 
damages, he has no cause of action against the 
bank." 
18 
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After the plaintiff, Harlin Construction Company, 
had rested its case in No. 169179, supra, counsel for 
Continental Bank made this statement (EXHIBIT 
D, Rec. 14): 
:NIR. COLTON: If the Court please, I would 
like at this time to dismiss on behalf of the de-
fendant, Continental Bank, on the basis of the 
testimony that has been admitted to date on be-
half of plaintiff's case. The Court is aware tli._: 
bank's position is a multiple one. 
First of all, of course, we see ourselves as a mm-
dleman. Resolution of course that that is if ~Ir. 
Harlin recovers against Mr. Stanley we would 
contend that we would, therefore, be entitled 
if he were to recover against us we would be 
entitled to cross claim against Mr. Stanley and 
recover from him or if indeed Mr. Stanley is 
successful in his defense, there would be no 
damage and we would be eliminated, of cour~e. 
That I can see that particular defenses woul 
depend on how the Court finds the facts at L .. 
end of the case. 
We still contend that the evidence now woulJ 
show no liability on the part of Continental and 
this would be on the basis of plaintiff's own tes-
timony uncontested without any question. 
It is to be noted that the counsel for Continental 
asked for dismissal, first on the cross claim and then on 
the main case. No objection to the dismissal was made 
by Stanley Title Company. 
In the case of Salt Lake City v. Utah Lake Farm-
ers Association, 4 Utah 2d 14, 286 P.2d 773, this Su-
preme Court said at page 778 of the Pacific Reporter: 
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In Bach v. _Quigan, D.C.N.Y. 1945, #F.R.D. 34, 
on page 36 the Court said: 
"This Court is in complete accord with the state-
ment of defendant that the new Rules of Civil 
Procedure have displaced any 'archaic, obsolete 
and confining rules' which may previously have 
governed federal procedure and that they are 
designed for the swift and just disposition of 
legal disputes. However, it was never contem-
plated that any set of facts which might event-
ually constitute a 'claim upon which relief can 
be granted' should be interposed as a counter-
claim to an action and it would not be an aid to 
the swift and just disposition of the matter to 
permit the issues to be confused by an uncertain 
claim, the substance of which is contingent upon 
the outcome of the principal action. 
"****it is doubtful whether the alleged wrong-
ful motive in instituting the action a_gainst de-
fendant Quigan gives rise to a claim for malicious 
abuse of process * * * such a claim does not ma-
ture and no relief can be granted upon it until 
the merits of the principal action have been deter-
mined.**" 
Continental Bank's counsel supported the last quo-
tation in his motion to dismiss which he made to the 
court, supra, in No. 169179, which on appeal was No. 
11504, the full record of which is a part of this appeal 
(Rec. 169179, Transcript page 98, Record page 417) . 
In case No. 11504 in this Supreme Court, 23 Utah 
2d 422, 464 P.2d 585 (1970), this Supreme Court the 
following order was made: 
And the same order is made as to the findings 
and judgment of Continental Bank on its cross-
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complaint against George Stanley and Stanley 
Title Company. 
Plaintiff, Stanley Title Company, in the instant 
case alleges in this connection: 
1. There was no independent cause of action al-
leged by cross claim in Civil Action No. 169179, supra, 
which stated a cause of action in existence at the time 
of the filing of such cross claim. 41 Am. J ur., pages 
473-474, #257, 258 supra. 
2. There was no trial held on any cross claim. 
Rule 52 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, pro-
vides as follows: 
FINDINGS BY THE COURT 
(a) EFFECT. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury, or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall, unless the same are waived, find 
the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon and direct the entry of 
the appropriate judgment. 
3. There were no findings of fact, nor conclusions 
of law filed by Continental Bank on its cross claim. 
4. There was no judgment entered by Continental 
Bank on its cross claim. 
5. This Supreme Court had nothnig before it on 
appeal on any judgment entered by Continental Bank. 
6. The above judgment granted in favor of Conti-
nental Bank was void for want of jurisdiction, and for 
want of due process of law, under the Constitution of 
the United States and the Constitution of the State of 
Utah. 
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In the case of W oldberg v. Industrial Commission, 
74 Utah 309, 279 P. 609, this Supreme Court said: 
We need not discuss or decide the legal effect 
of these matters for the reason that this court 
will inquire into its own jurisdiction however that 
question may be called to its attention. "We have 
no right to proceed to a decision of the merits 
on any case where the law forbids us the right 
to do so whether the parties desire it or not.'' 
McCashland v. Keogh, 32 Utah 11, 88 P. 680. 
Appellant is not arguing the merits of the present 
case on appeal because the defendant and respondent 
has not yet answered the complaint, but appellant 
strongly urges that it is entitled to its day in court and 
a fair trial which it has not had. 
CONCLUSION 
The complaint (Rec. 1-14) states a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. It alleges facts which show 
on the face of the record that the judgment of February 
26, 1970, (Rec. 11-13) was void for want of due process 
of law. The "Order" of September 1, 1970 (Rec. 20-22) 
should be vacated and set aside, and the trial Court 
ordered to deny the Motion to Dismiss (Rec. 15-16), 
and further order the defendant, Continental Bank, 
to answer or otherwise plead to the complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
George H. Stanley 
Attorney for Appellant 
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